Number Stations 2.0: Information-Theoretic Asynchronous Messaging via Public-Receive SMS Infrastructure
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20042412 ↗
One-time-pad cipher disguised as ordinary SMS verification codes. Information-theoretic security (provably unbreakable, even by quantum computers) on commodity SMS infrastructure. Foundation paper for the AriaLabs cryptographic stack.
Self-Renewing One-Time Pad: Information-Theoretic Messaging Beyond Initial Pad Exhaustion
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20042342 ↗
Solves the century-old key-distribution problem of one-time-pad cryptography. Once an initial pad is shared in person, all future pad material can be transmitted as encrypted payload over the existing OTP channel itself. Extends NS2.0 to indefinite use without re-meeting.
HNBP-CORE: Cross-Platform Tamper-Evident Witness Logs for User-Side State Integrity and AI System Audit Compliance
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20042398 ↗
A 50-line tamper-evident hash-chain protocol for detecting modifications to user-side state. No blockchains, no consensus, no third parties. SHA-256 + timestamping. The audit primitive that anchors integrity claims across the AriaLabs portfolio.
HNBPv2: Pad-Bound Anonymous Attestation Chains
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20944364 ↗
Extends HNBP-CORE to support anonymous attestation chains where the signer’s identity is a hash-tree commitment to a one-time pad rather than a public key. No certificate authority, no key rotation, post-quantum by construction. A rollover protocol carries a single root identity across multiple pad lifetimes. For press-freedom infrastructure, human rights documentation, dissident comms, and post-quantum federated identity.
Multi-Device HNBP Cross-Attestation: Tamper-Evident Logging Across Device Boundary
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21214945 ↗
HNBP-CORE provides tamper-evident logging on a single device. This paper extends it across device boundaries, letting multiple devices belonging to the same principal cross-attest each other's audit chains without a central authority. Handles interleaved and delayed events via a race-free append protocol.
Aria Station: Pocket-Sized, Information-Theoretically Perfect Messaging
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20634483 ↗
One-time-pad confidentiality over Tor with pad-derived onion rendezvous: two phones derive their meeting point from the shared pad and never exchange an address. Companion paper to the Aria Station messenger.
MultiPad: Multi-Recipient One-Time-Pad Broadcast
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20791419 ↗
Honest tiered constructions for sealing one message to many recipients: pure-OTP per-recipient sealing where stakes demand it, hybrid envelope (computational message + information-theoretic key distribution) where scale demands it. Adds per-recipient authentication, forward secrecy via pad ratcheting, revocation, and an HNBP-bound pad ledger that turns the pad into an audited resource.
Public Sealed Vault: Publicly Committed, Quorum-Unsealable Evidence from Inverted MultiPad
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20791421 ↗
A sealer commits a message at a math-derived public address; the OTP bytes are split via information-theoretic secret sharing across N custodians. The world sees that something sealed exists; only k of N custodians, agreeing together, can ever surface the contents. Post-quantum end-to-end. Removes the single-trusted-party from whistleblowing, custodially-separated evidence, dead-man release, and time-buried archives.
Pad-Anchored Mutual Obligation: A Non-Money Bilateral-Trust Substrate Riding One-Time-Pad Messaging Infrastructure
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21214875 ↗
A bilateral commerce substrate where two parties record and settle mutual obligations anchored to a pre-shared one-time pad. No coin, no chain, no issuer — the entire claim is bilateral memory, not asset math. Formal negative-spec refusing KYC, programmable money, and surveillance ledger. Traces lineage through Hawala, Mesopotamian temple-tablet debt, and the Hanseatic League. AriaLedger's protocol layer.
Pad-Sealed Mixnets: Information-Theoretic Content Secrecy over Computational Metadata Anonymity
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20791425 ↗
Composition of one-time pads with Sphinx-format mixnet routing. Mixnets protect metadata, OTPs protect content — orthogonal, compose cleanly. Stacking the two yields simultaneous metadata-anonymity AND quantum-safe content secrecy, a posture neither layer provides alone. Includes NS2-over-mixnet selective-decode broadcast, Pad Beacon cover traffic addressing the bounded-storage objection, and HNBP-over-mixnet audit chains.
Hybrid-Sealed Media: OTP-Authenticated AES-256-GCM for Bandwidth-Bounded One-Time-Pad Messaging
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20944368 ↗
Solves the OTP-exhaustion-under-media-payload problem. Each photo or short video draws 48 bytes of pad to derive a fresh AES-256-GCM key plus a Wegman-Carter MAC key — constant pad cost regardless of media size. Information-theoretic integrity of the wire wrapper, computational (post-quantum-safe under Grover) confidentiality of the payload. The trade is explicit, named, and surfaced to the user.
AriaPad-Sealed Glyphs: Information-Theoretically Secure, Infrastructure-Free Transmission of Images and Arbitrary Media as Character-Encoded One-Time-Pad Payloads
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21214880 ↗
A one-time-pad text messenger is not a text messenger — it is a universal sealed carrier. Any medium reducible to compact characters (images as colored glyph blocks, maps, low-rate video frames, files) becomes just a message. Identifies and closes a CRIME/BREACH-class ciphertext-length side channel via fixed-frame padding. The pure-OTP tier companion to Hybrid-Sealed Media.
Pad-MAC'd Anonymous Broadcast over a Point-to-Point Mixnet
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20944581 ↗
Turns a general-purpose mixnet (Nym) into an anonymous broadcast medium. Subscribers poll the creator’s mixnet address with one-time-pad-MAC’d requests; the creator responds with broadcasts they haven’t seen. No follower list, no view count, no engagement metric — mathematical impossibilities by protocol, not policy choices. Information-theoretic wire integrity, mixnet-anonymous subscribers.
Honest Dice: Provably-Uniform One-Time Pads from Physical Entropy
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20791412 ↗
A simple, correct construction for building a one-time pad from physical dice without introducing the bias most do-it-yourself methods quietly add. Accumulates rolls as a base-6 integer with a fixed entropy headroom that bounds bias by 2−s. No hashing, no conditioning, no discarded rolls — every roll's full log₂6 ≈ 2.585 bits is captured.
Bi-Temporal Witness Logs: Cryptographically Committed Observation-Time Claims in Tamper-Evident Chains
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20791423 ↗
Extends HNBP-CORE chains to separate ingestion time (Ting, proven by the chain) from observation time (Tobs, committed as a non-repudiable claim at Ting). Editing Tobs after the fact requires forking the chain — detectable. Enables provable scientific priority across mutually distrustful writers when combined with Bitcoin-anchored cross-chain comparison.
The Marks Protocol: Information-Theoretic Mutual Authentication for Network Access via Out-of-Stream One-Time Pads
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20499340 ↗
Mutual authentication with information-theoretic security, using out-of-stream one-time-pad material so two parties prove identity without a computational assumption.
X25519 Remote Device Pairing over ARK Station Networks with HNBP Identity Anchoring
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20042408 ↗
Establish a shared one-time pad between two devices over the internet using elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman, no physical contact required. Pairing completes in under 60 seconds, no accounts, no PKI. Identity anchored to each device's HNBP-CORE chain for audit.
Hail Protocol v1.0: A Federated Async Telephony Protocol with User-Owned Metadata Audit
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20091850 ↗
Federated async telephony where recipients are network-invisible (never register on phone networks), inbound contact is mediated through user-chosen rendezvous channels, and every signaling event is witnessed in a tamper-evident HNBP-CORE hash chain on the user's own device. Five transport modes: PSTN-bridged, self-hosted gateway, federated peer-to-peer, onion-hidden, chat-carried.
The Tier Doctrine: Tier-Visible Cryptographic Interfaces as User Empowerment
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21214943 ↗
Modern consumer cryptography systematically hides tier information from the user. A text message and a photograph in the same app get different actual protection while presenting an identical lock icon. This paper argues cryptographic tier is user-empowerment content, not implementation detail — and proposes tier-visible interfaces as an honest design pattern.
AriaVenona: One-Time-Pad Operational Doctrine for Passive-Receive Channels
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20499274 ↗
The operational doctrine for the AriaLabs one-time-pad stack: all security lives in the pad, never in code secrecy — so systems can be disclosed in the open without weakening them.
NFC-OTP: NFC-Based Key Distribution and Dead-Drop Messaging for Information-Theoretic Offline Cryptography
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20173204 ↗
Specifies a protocol for distributing one-time-pad key material and transferring encrypted messages via NFC tags, integrated into the ARK single-HTML-file workstation. Combines NS2.0 (information-theoretic cipher), NFC physical-channel transfer (no internet required), and browser-only runtime (no app store, no platform vendor) to yield an offline messaging system structurally immune to platform coercion, cryptographic algorithm failure, and network-layer surveillance. Reference hardware total cost: approximately $5 USD.
APM-Addr Piggyback Inside OTP Ciphertext: Auto-Learning Peer Mixnet Addresses Without Separate Handshake
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.21214949 ↗
Mixnet addresses issued by Nym rotate between sessions. In a pair-pad messenger, the receiver's fresh address must reach the sender fast enough to keep the conversation alive. This paper piggybacks the address inside the OTP ciphertext at zero pad cost, using Wegman-Carter MAC integrity — no separate handshake, no infrastructure.
NS2-Receive: Information-Theoretic One-Way Anonymous Reception — Unifying NS2.0 and NFC-OTP into a Correlation-Resistant Architecture
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20499338 ↗
A receive-only anonymous channel with information-theoretic security, extending the Number Stations 2.0 line to one-way reception.
ARK: A Portable Single-File Cryptographic Workstation Implementing Number Stations 2.0
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20069222 ↗
First deployed reference implementation of NS2.0. A single self-contained HTML file you can drop on any USB stick or run on any device with a browser. Zero infrastructure. Live end-to-end test on 2026-05-07: two physically distinct devices exchanged a plaintext message bit-for-bit, pad established via QR optical channel + USB transport.
ARK v1.0 Steganographic Image Transport: An LSB-Encoded Cryptographic Carrier for Offline Messaging
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20173206 ↗
Specifies the steganographic image transport feature shipped in ARK v1.0 (2026-05-11). LSB pixel-channel steganography combined with the NS2.0 cipher: encrypted message bytes embedded one bit per pixel RGB channel of any cover image, then shared through any image-capable channel (Signal, iMessage, Telegram, email, Bluetooth, USB). The carrier looks like an ordinary photo to any observer not holding the matching pad. Includes wire format, capacity analysis, channel compatibility matrix, and threat model.
Number Stations 2.0 — ns2-aria-v1 Implementation Profile and Wire Demonstration
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20091852 ↗
A profile of the Number Stations 2.0 cipher sized to fit one standard SMS payload (160 chars), plus the first publicly recorded demonstration of NS2.0 ciphertext successfully delivered through a commercial CPaaS to an end-user mobile phone over real cellular SMS infrastructure (2026-05-08). Companion artifact to the foundational NS2.0 specification.
Latent-Addressed Networking: A Federated Overlay Architecture for AI-Native Nodes
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20499342 ↗
A new addressing scheme: address nodes and content by values derived from shared state rather than hashes of communicated bytes. The architectural ground that Aria Station's pad-derived rendezvous later instantiates.
Bitcoin's Implementation Gap: Why the Wallet Is the Security Boundary
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20499336 ↗
Where Bitcoin's real security boundary lies in practice — the wallet, not the protocol — and the implementation gap that follows.
The Faro Archetype: A Behavioral Signature for Founder-Class Concealment Failures in High-Consequence Technology
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.20499344 ↗
A behavioral-signature analysis of a recurring founder-class concealment-failure pattern.